(Identity Series: see Defining Sexuality, Intelligence, Blank Slate)
Though by no means an actual positive account. This is simply because most human behavior, especially social relationships and what is happening within the brain/body of an individual during a social encounter, is far beyond our descriptive reach.
Though by no means an actual positive account. This is simply because most human behavior, especially social relationships and what is happening within the brain/body of an individual during a social encounter, is far beyond our descriptive reach.
I have read a little on these issues and this is the only specified
genetically based positive account of sexuality that I recall noticing, albeit for
mice. The analysis I read of this study was suggesting a possible route for genetic sexuality structures in humans. This is the general idea, see section 6.4.1.3 here. I
originally read this elsewhere, but it was an
analysis of this paper. The whole chapter that is linked is a good rundown of
pheromones. We can take or leave the study given that what we
care about is the possibility of what a mechanistic picture looks
like. The main idea is that a gene in male mice was controlling some social behavioral responses, especially as coupled with the female releasing a
certain pheromone. The claim is that male mice that lacked the gene
were more likely to engage in same sex behavior, partially because
their male-male aggressive response was no longer as strong. And
similarly, female mice would be more likely to engage in same-sex
behavior if the same gene was turned off.
Physical lesions of the VNO impair lordosis behavior in female mice (Keller et al. 2006), suggesting that pheromones sensed by the vomeronasal system also play an important role in female sexual behavior (Keller et al. 2009). However, once again, the behavioral deficits of TRPC2 knockout mice appear to differ from the effects of physical lesions of the VNO. Dulac reported that TRPC2 knockout female mice showed significantly higher levels of malelike sexual behavior, including ultrasonic vocalization and mounting of other females (Wysocki and Lepri, 1991; Kimchi et al. 2007). This would suggest that sex-specific behavioral patterns of male and female mice are at least partly dependent on ongoing sensory input rather than being developmentally determined. But, other groups have not reported such effects, and both male and female mice with physical VNO lesions are capable of discriminating sexual identity of urine odors (Keller et al. 2009). The differences that have been reported between the behavioral effects of physical VNO lesions and knockout of the TRPC2 gene might arise due to developmental effects of the knockout, or due to the presence of VSNs that do not use the TRPC2 transduction pathway (Kelliher et al. 2006).
Though we have very little understanding of the human mechanistic
picture when it comes to social behaviors (and hence social emotions,
complex desires, etc.), there is good reason to believe that many
mechanistic facts, like the above, structure some of our bodily/brain
responses. But there is a good reason to believe that there would be
multiply tiered, multiply nested structures there. Our social
behaviors and bodily response systems have all sorts of factors at
play, including more reflective and socially learned
behavioral responses. Even for the mices' sexual behaviors and social
behaviors, the authors of these papers recognize that such social
behaviors in mice are effected by all sorts of things. But they have
enough evidence, holding some other factors in place, that the
mechanisms they find (say the turning off of certain genes) are
leading to changes in behaviors to some degree.
The key here though is the gap between our description of human
social behavior and the kind of categorizing we do. Two
linguistic notes. One is just that categorization and naming tends to erase differences, to make those
differences non-noticeable. This effect is likely multiplied as we
delineate broad social behaviors into categories. The second is a
reifying factor, especially as reflective human behaviors are
concerned. The taking in of an identity category, one that we believe
is salient, can shape our behaviors. When that category is about
one's self or other selves, such categories will go on to shape and
reshape social responses and to influence further thoughts, actions, and social institutions.
Just to lighten the mood, let us similarly dispel the concept of
love. If mechanistically something like this happens between two
people who are in “love”, say between a female/female couple, and
this is what causes attachments and subsequent emotions, it is quite
common to hear things to the effect, "but oh well, such a
mechanistic picture does not matter, such feelings and emotions are
still real.” Well the problem is that despite being emotional
beings, we are also reflective beings. And if a scientist comes along
and showed that feelings of love between two individuals is only
bodily reaction to a chemical that gets attuned between
two people, and the scientists proves such by duplicating the
chemical and spraying it on the nearest teddy bear, and both
individuals instantly love the teddy bear as much as each other, well
these individuals are likely to be a little weary of what their
bodily responses mean. This is of course an absurd picture, there is
good reason to think that our attachments and bodily responses are at
least a little more complex. There may be some underhanded
confabulation. Something like “she loves her voice,” where the
connection only is ephemerally tied in after the fact of the chemical
attraction (assuming such a story). In time, however, such things may become tied, such as
the partner and the partner's voice become an intellectually
inseparable fact in the brain, even if at first such attachment was
only some chemical quirk.
With all that said, if love is only this mechanism by cellular and
bodily processes, and then taken in more widely within an
intellectual sphere, I think many people may respond significantly
differently to relationships. We humans are probably wont to say
that: “If this idiotic pheromonal response is all coupling amounts
to, then why should we respect it as a way to organize our selves,
and our relationships, when I can just as easily spread a little
pheromone over here on this teddy bear and experience the
blissfulness of the emotional response. There are other things we
need from relationships, but this bodily response is not what such
should be built on.” Now, with that said, given both that our
stories are not that simple nor can we begin to
understand them, and given the way that all of this seats into our
brain/mind/body in a nested mesh, we will probably never be able to
fully reproduce the above, given that attachments, emotional
responses, and thoughts are intertwined. We also probably do not have the
intellectual architecture to make such acknowledgments and
arrangements. Though, I will say, that some people have probably been
moved by lines like “sugar intake is a blissful experience caused
by evolutionary arrangement,” and then have gone on to alter
behavior. There will be even more profound changes in the future as
we reflect on the accidents of our evolutionary and genetic makeups,
and find ways to alter or get around such, whether through medicine,
technology, or social attitudes.
Back to mechanism, it does not matter what exactly the mechanistic story is that
is configuring at the most baseline level, say the level evolution originally “cared” about. Such a level is going to be
vastly bereft of the conceptual imagery that we lay on top of it. And
this, quite frankly, is the psychologists' problem, that is, they are
helping to reify characteristics that when cognitive scientists or
even evolutionary psychologist go fishing for mechanisms or a
mechanistic story, they are going to find something that is vastly
different than the socially proposed or psychologically proposed
definition of a given characteristic. The cognitive scientist along with biologists of various stripes should
eventually be able to tell the story, but it is going to come with
endless culturally mediated behavioral aspects that get nested onto more fundamental structures. The mechanisms may be
active and encouraging some of the complex social behavior in question, but the
entire story will not be anywhere close to represented, at least
within the more general mechanisms at the inherent genetic level.
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